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ABSTRACT
this paper examines the effect of outside block-holders’ ownership 
on the demand for corporate monitoring in relation to agency theory 
in the Malaysian business environment. the results of this study 
provide evidence that, given the cultural differences, the agents and 
the principals may act differently. the findings indicate that block-
holders in Malaysia appear to demand more monitoring costs as their 
shareholdings increase. this positive relationship may be associated 
with the demand for more monitoring by minority shareholders 
as a balance against the power of the majority shareholders in the 
concentrated business environment in Malaysia and the tighten 
regulations after 1997/98 financial crisis. Further investigation shows 
that the institutional and non-institutional block-holders react and 
demand different level of monitoring costs. the institutional block-
holders who are mostly government related institutions appear to 
demand more monitoring costs as their share ownership increase, while 
the non-institutional shareholders are associated with less monitoring 
costs as their shares increase.
Keywords: agency theory, block-holders, monitoring costs, 
institutional shareholders.
INTRODUCTION
agency theory postulates that firms consists of a contract between the owner of 
economic resources (the principal) and management (the agents) who is charged 
with using and controlling these resources (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). this 
theory posits an inherent moral hazard problem in these relationships, which in 
turn give rise to agency costs for the organisation. the agency relationship between 
the principals and the agents give rise to agency costs because the managers may 
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not act in the owners’ best interest, such as consumption of excessive perquisites 
and sub-optimal investments (Fleming, heaney and McCosker., 2005). It is 
suggested that ownership structure tends to mitigate the conflicts of interests 
between shareholders and managers. one of the ownership structure suggested 
by the literature to mitigate the agency cost is through concentrated ownership 
(Fleming et al., 2005).  It is claimed that concentrated ownership by outside 
shareholders (such as block-holders), have greater incentives to align management 
and shareholders’ interests (li and Simerly, 1998). block-holders are also said to 
facilitate behaviour-based monitoring from the capital market (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
prior studies claim that share ownership by block-holders can help to monitor 
agency problems (agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Fleming et al., 2005; Fosberg, 
2004; o’Sullivan, 2000). this is due to the fact that shareholders of an organisation 
have a residual claim on the earnings and assets of the organisation and therefore 
bear proportional to their share ownership, the economic consequences of actions 
taken by organisation managers and directors. If managers engage in opportunistic 
behaviour, shareholders bear a portion of the costs of such actions (Fama and Jensen, 
1983). large shareholders are also claimed to have greater incentive to monitor 
management and have the necessary power to influence the company’s policies 
since they will bear a significant proportion of managers’ value destroying actions 
(haniffa and hudaib, 2006). 
besides that agency theory is also criticised for its ignorance of the existence 
of social and authority relationship and assumes social life is a series of contract 
(Johnson and droege, 2004). It is unknown whether the agency theory findings 
in western countries have equal impact in asian organisations (Ekanayake, 
2004; Johnson and droege, 2004). previous literature (Conlon and parks, 1990; 
hassabElnaby and Mosebach, 2005; Ekanayake, 2004) indicates that there is a 
possibility that given the cultural differences, the typical nature of agents in agency 
theory may not be the case with regard to non-western countries. Sharp and Salter 
(1997) argue that the agency effects are lower in asia. It is also claimed that there 
is a limited empirical research that directly tests agency theory in different cultural 
context (Ekanayake, 2004).
previous study claims that in asian countries (such as Malaysia) which are 
considered as newly industrialised economies, the corporate governance involved 
is slightly different from those in developed countries (Nam and Nam, 2004). they 
state that businesses in asian countries are said to be concentrated and the agency 
problem exists not between the management and owners in general, but between 
the management (the large shareholders) and the minority shareholders. this issue 
has also been highlighted in oECd Report (oECd, 2006, p. 71). the report claims 
that the ownership structure in asian listed companies with large shareholders 
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(e.g. blockholders) often creates problems for non-controlling shareholders 
(e.g. minority) to properly effectuate their shareholders rights. this is supported 
by haniffa and hudaib (2006) in their study using Malaysian data, who claim that 
protection of minority shareholders is problematic in this concentrated business 
environment. 
In Nam and Nam (2004) study of corporate governance in asia, they further 
claim that the existence of large shareholdings will only give beneficial effect 
when management is separated from ownership and proper corporate governance 
mechanisms are in place, so that the outside shareholders can effectively check 
misbehaviour of the controlling owners. therefore, this study defines outside block-
holders as those shareholders who hold at least 5% or more of a voting right in an 
organisation and are not linked to the organisation management in either business 
or family relationship. Specifically this study focuses on the effect of outside block-
holders ownership on the agency costs of Malaysian public listed companies. this 
study uses the direct measure of agency costs, which are the cost of monitoring the 
companies as recommended by Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (FCCG, 
2001). this study aims to provide evidence that support or reject prior research 
findings in western countries relating to the effect of block-holders in the agency 
relationship which is reflected in its agency costs. 
the results indicate a positive relationship between outside block-holders 
shareholdings and monitoring costs. this finding appears to be slightly different 
from earlier studies in western countries. the finding indicates that as the percentage 
of shareholdings by block-holders increase, the monitoring costs also increase. this 
positive relationship may be associated with the demand for more monitoring by 
minority shareholders as a balance against the power of the major shareholders in 
the concentrated business environment in the country and the tighten regulations 
after 1997/98 financial crisis. Further investigation of the result indicates that greater 
ownership by institutional shareholders is associated with greater monitoring costs.
this paper is organised as follows: the following section discusses the relevant 
literature on the role played by block-holders ownership in agency setting and 
how it affects the agency costs. the methodology section describes the research 
methods employed in this study and followed by the discussion of the empirical 
finding. the paper ends with the conclusion of the research.  
LITERATURE REVIEW
prior studies posit that block-holders’ ownership has greater incentives and 
capability to monitor management (Singh and davidson, 2003; Fleming et al., 
2005; Fosberg, 2004).  It is claimed that share ownership by block-holders can help 
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to monitor agency problems (agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Fleming et al., 2005; 
Fosberg, 2004; o’Sullivan, 2000). this is due to the fact that shareholders of an 
organisation have a residual claim on the earnings and assets of the organisation and 
therefore bear proportional to their share ownership, the economic consequences 
of actions taken by organisation managers and directors. If managers engage in 
opportunistic behaviour, shareholders bear a portion of the costs of such actions 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). large shareholders are also claimed to have greater 
incentive to monitor management and have the necessary power to influence the 
company’s policies since they will bear a significant proportion of managers’ 
value destroying actions (haniffa and hudaib, 2006). on the other hand, a well-
diversified investor is not particularly worried as the bankruptcy risk of any one 
organisation in the portfolio of investments will not have a large impact on their 
wealth. Consequently, a shareholder’s incentive to monitor insiders and ensure that 
the organisation is properly managed is directly related to the proportion of the 
organisation’s shares that the shareholder owns. block-holders are also expected 
to favour more extensive audit as they view the audit process as an important 
mechanism to monitor managerial behaviour, and consequently pay higher audit fees 
as they have the financial incentives to ensure maximum monitoring is undertaken 
(o’Sullivan, 2000). 
It is also said that block-holders existence in an organisation can resolve the 
conflict of interests over financing policy arise between managers and shareholders 
because of the fact that managers preference for lower organisation risk due to 
their under-diversification (Fama, 1980), and managers’ dislike to being subject 
to performance pressure that large fixed interest payment entails (Jensen, 1986). 
Managerial insiders are reluctant to use the optimal amount of debt financing for 
the organisation because of the additional bankruptcy risk associated with higher 
level of debt engender (Fosberg, 2004). therefore managers will not issue the 
optimal amount of debt without pressure from a disciplining force (Jensen, 1986). 
however, the shareholders want the leverage to be used at its optimal level in 
order to maximize the organisation value. berger, ofek and yernack (1997) and 
borokhovich, brunarski, harman, and Kehr (2005) claim that this conflict can be 
resolved by having block-holders in the organisation as they find that leverage 
rises in the presence of significant block-holders. block-holders are found to be 
an effective monitoring mechanism as it forces the managers to use more debts in 
the organisation’s capital structure than the managers’ personally desired (Fosberg, 
2004). 
a study using Malaysian data by Mat Nor and Sulong (2007) postulates that 
large share ownership provides the incentive of controlling shareholders to use 
their influence to maximize value, exert control and to protect their interest in the 
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company. Shareholders of an organisation is said to have a residual claim on the 
earnings and assets of the organisation and therefore bear proportional to their share 
ownership, and the economic consequences of actions taken by the organisation 
managers and directors (haniffa and hudaib, 2006). If managers engaged in 
opportunistic behaviour, shareholders bear a portion of the costs of such actions. 
Findings from previous studies on the impacts of block-holders on monitoring 
costs (agency costs) are mixed. o’Sullivan (2000) and peel and Clatworthy 
(2001) find no evidence that ownership by block-holders has a significant impact 
on monitoring costs of uK companies. Singh and davidson (2003) also find no 
significant influence of block-holders on reducing managerial spending, which 
is used as a proxy for agency costs of uS companies. however, Chen and yur-
austin (2007) find a negative significant relationship between block-holders and 
managerial extravagance, a proxy for agency costs, and they conclude that block-
holders significantly curtail the managers’ discretionary spending of uS companies.
previous studies also claim that, asian countries (such as Malaysia) which 
have concentrated businesses are dominated by large shareholders who exercise 
their rights (haniffa and hudaib, 2006; oECd, 2006, p. 71). Nam and Nam (2004) 
claim that the existence of large shareholdings may be a blessing as previous studies 
claim that companies with large shareholders tend to perform better. however, 
according to them, the beneficial effect of large shareholders can only be expected 
when management is separated from ownership, so that the outside shareholders 
can effectively check misbehaviour of the controlling owners. hay, Knechel and 
ling, (2008) claim that having block-holders in an organisation may contribute 
to negative or positive effect on the monitoring costs. hay et al. (2008) suggests 
that there are two possible outcome of having block-holders in the governance 
structure of an organisation. the first outcome is consistent with agency theory. a 
block-holder that is actively involved in operations and decision making may have 
such a broad span of control over activities and internal control that the need for 
other mechanisms such as external auditing may be reduced. on the other hand, a 
major outside shareholder may also use this influence to increase external auditing 
to compensate for a lack of control over other internal decisions.
In asian countries, which involved concentrated business environment, the 
researcher believes that the large shareholders may dominate the companies and 
affect the monitoring costs of the companies. thus, this study aims to investigate 
the effect of outside block holders’ ownership on the monitoring costs (agency 
costs) in Malaysian business environment.
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Data and Sample
data for the study was collected using primary and secondary sources. primary 
data was collected using cross-sectional questionnaire surveys. Questionnaires were 
sent to all 867 Malaysian listed companies as at 31 december 2006. data collection 
cannot be done solely by using secondary data, as some of the information needed 
(such as internal audit costs) for the study is not available from secondary sources 
(such as annual reports). 
after considering the incomplete and inconsistence questionnaires, there 
were 235 usable samples for the study (27.10% response rate). the data was also 
inspected for outliers by means of standard regression diagnostics at three standard 
deviations (hair et al., 1998, p.65). Normality check of the data was also carried out 
and some of the measures were transformed into logarithm to control for skewed 
nature of data. as multivariate regression is used to analyze the data in this study, 
assumptions of multicollinearity, homoscedasticity and linearity are also tested. 
Variable Definition
this study uses measurements that are directly related to these firms in monitoring 
the shareholders wealth of their companies as outlined by the Malaysian Code of 
Corporate Governance (FCCG, 2001). directorship and auditing (internal and 
external) are specified as monitoring mechanisms in the Code. thus, the dependent 
variables in this study involve the costs of these monitoring mechanisms demanded 
by the organisations. however, as the executive directors are in-charged of managing 
the companies, and the non-executive directors are said to monitor and controlling 
the opportunistic behaviour of the management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; haniffa 
and hudaib, 2006), this study does not include executive directors’ remuneration as 
monitoring costs. hence, total monitoring (MoNItoR) is measured by the sum of 
organisation investment in non-executive directors’ remunerations (dIRREMNEd), 
internal auditors’ costs (INtCoSt) and external auditors’ costs (EXtCoSt). 
the independent variable in this study is block-holders ownership (blKoWN). 
this study defines the block-holders as the total percentage of shareholding of 
block-holders who hold at least 5% or more of a voting right in an organisation 
and are not linked to the organisation management in either business or family 
relationship. the controlled variables included in the study are size, complexity, 
performance, risk, growth, listing status and industry. 
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the following model is used to analyse the relationship between the monitoring 
costs and block holders ownership:
MoNItoR = αi – b1blKoWNi + b2 RECINV + b3CoMplEXi 
+ b4SIzEi – b5dEbtStRC – b6RISKi – b7Roai + 
b8GRoWthi + b9lIStStati + εi
Where:
MoNItoR = natural logarithm of total monitoring costs which are the sum 
of external audit costs, internal audit costs and non-executive 
directors remuneration
α = Intercept
blKoWN = percentage of block-holders’ shareholdings  
RECINV = (Inventories and Receivables)/ total assets
CoMplEX = natural logarithm of no of subsidiaries (including its head-
office)
SIzE = natural logarithm of total assets
dEbtStRC = long term debt / Market value of the firm
RISK = 1 if have loss in current year, and 0 otherwise;
Roa = profit before interest and tax  / total assets
GRoWth = Market value of the firm / total assets
lIStStat = 1 if listed in the main board, and 0 otherwise;
εi = error term
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
Descriptive Statistics
table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the study. the 
results of standard tests on skewness and kurtosis in table 1 indicate that there is 
no problem with normality assumption. thus, these variables can reasonably be 
considered as normally distributed. In summary, the model does not violate the 
basic olS assumptions and could be used to test the relationship in this study. 
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Table 1 Normality test statistics of sample companies
Variable Mean Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis
MoNItoR 12.9841 1.0005 0.864 0.922
blKoWN 0.1517 0.1911 1.500 1.470
dEbtStRC 0.1468 0.1584 1.860 4.366
REVINV 0.3088 0.1945 0.329 -0.888
CoMplEX 2.4998 0.9091 0.232 1.430
RISK 0.2000 0.3980 1.544 0.386
SIzE 19.744 1.4171 0.911 0.887
lIStStat 0.7400 0.4370 -1.130 -0.731
Roa 0.0101 0.2259 -10.814 140.20
GRoWth 1.0515 0.7092   5.424 42.856
Variable definition:
MoNIItoR = total monitoring costs(ln); blKoWN = block-holders shareholdings (%); dEbtStRC 
= long term debt to market value of the firm; SIzE = total assets(ln); CoMplEX = number of 
subsidiaries(ln); RECINV = Ratio of inventories and receivables to total assets; Roa = Roa; 
RISK = Current year loss(dummy); GRoWth = tobin’s Q; lIStStat = board listing (dummy) 
table 2 presents the correlation matrix for the dependent and independent 
variables. the result indicates that there is no multicollinearity problem, as the 
correlations are below the threshold value of 0.8 (Gujarati, 2003, p. 359). VIF 
readings for the model is between 1.037 to 2.606, which is below the threshold 
value of 10 (as claimed by hair et al., 1998, p. 193; Gujarati, 2003, p.362).
36
International Journal of Economics and Management
T
ab
le
 2
 C
or
re
la
ti
on
 m
at
ri
x
Variable
MONITOR
BLKOWN
DEBTSTR
RECINV
RISK
SIZE
COMPLEX
ROA
GROWTH
LISTSTAT
M
o
N
It
o
R
1.
00
b
l
K
o
W
N
0.
31
**
*
1.
00
d
E
b
t
S
t
R
C
0.
24
**
*
0.
08
1.
00
R
E
C
IN
V
-0
.2
1*
**
0.
16
**
*
-0
.3
7*
**
1.
00
R
IS
K
-0
.2
5*
**
-0
.0
9*
0.
07
0.
00
1.
00
S
Iz
E
0.
82
**
*
0.
28
**
*
0.
42
**
*
-0
.4
0*
**
-0
.2
3*
**
1.
00
C
o
M
p
l
E
X
0.
61
**
*
0.
05
0.
22
**
*
-0
.1
4*
*
-0
.0
4
0.
52
**
*
1.
00
R
o
a
0.
15
**
-0
.0
2
0.
02
0.
05
-0
.4
3*
**
0.
20
**
*
-0
.0
5
1.
00
G
R
o
W
t
h
0.
09
*
0.
18
**
*
-0
.1
6*
*
0.
00
0.
01
0.
05
-0
.0
4
-0
.5
0*
**
1.
00
l
IS
t
S
ta
t
0.
32
**
*
0.
15
**
*
0.
06
-0
.2
3*
**
-0
.2
8*
**
0.
47
**
*
0.
21
**
*
0.
18
**
*
0.
06
1.
00
N
ot
es
: 
**
* 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 a
t 1
%
 le
ve
l
 
**
 s
ig
ni
fi
ca
nt
 a
t 5
%
 le
ve
l
 
* 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 a
t 1
0%
 le
ve
l
(S
ee
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
de
fi
ni
ti
on
 in
 t
ab
le
 1
)
37
blockholders and Corporate Monitoring Costs: Evidence from Malaysia
Results of the Study
Column two of table 3 presents the multiple regression analysis used to test the main 
model. the adjusted R squared for the model is 0.754 and the F-value of 80.857 is 
statistically significant (p <0.000). the value of the adjusted R squared is very high, 
as well as statistically significant, which suggests that it is a good predictive model 
of monitoring costs for Malaysian data. It means more than 75% of the variation 
in the monitoring costs can be explained by the model.  this adjusted R squared is 
also very much higher compared to a similar study by anderson et al. (1993) on 
monitoring cost, which use australian data, where its adjusted R-squared is 0.423. 
Table 3 Cross sectional olS regression of monitoring costs on 
block-holders ownership
Variables
As per main 
model 
Block-holders are 
segmented into 
institutional and 
non-institutional
Block-holders are 
categorised into 
zero, low and high 
shareholdings
INtERCEpt 1.770**
(2.735)
1.839**
(2.823)
1.756**
(2.583)
blKoWN 0.573**
(3.162)
INStblKoWN 0.599**
(3.266)
NoN-INStblKoWN -0.228
(-0.266)
hIGh blKoWN 0.147*
(1.829)
loW blKoWN -0.182**
(-2.306)
dEbtStRC -0.571**
(-2.331)
-0.574**
(-2.341)
-0.550**
(-2.267)
RECINV 0.426**
(2.215)
0.441**
(2.283)
0.381**
(2.002)
SIzE 0.531***
(14.444)
0.527***
(14.280)
0.534***
(14.875)
CoMplEX 0.288***
(6.515)
0.289***
(6.546)
0.298***
(6.803)
RISK -0.153
(-1.594)
-0.157
(-1.633)
-0.176*
(-1.850)
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Roa 0.134
(0.657)
0.122
(0.597)
0.194
(0.960)
GRoWth 0.081
(1.371)
0.077
(1.316)
0.104*
(1.792)
lIStStat -0.237**
(-2.725)
-0.238**
(-2.734)
-0.235**
(-2.728)
R-squared
Adj R-squared
F-Statistics
P-value
0.764
0.754
80.857
0.000000
0.765
0.754
72.835
0.000000
0.770
0.760
75.105
0.000000
Notes:  *** significant at 1% level
** significant at 5% level
* significant at 10% level
(See variable definition in table 1)
Concentrated ownership by block-holders in the main model (Column 2 of 
table 3) is significant, but not in the predicted direction as expected under the 
agency theory. the result suggests that as the percentage of ownership by block-
holders increases, more monitoring costs are incurred. Earlier studies on this 
ownership variable in relation to agency and monitoring costs were mixed. there 
are two possible outcomes of having block-holders in the governance structure 
of a company as suggested by hay et al., (2008). the first outcome is consistent 
with agency theory where an active block-holder who is involved in operations 
and decision making may have such a broad span of control over activities and 
internal control that the need for other monitoring mechanism may be reduced, thus 
this will give a negative relationship. alternatively, a major outside shareholder 
may also use this influence to demand more monitoring to compensate for a lack 
of control over other internal decisions; this will give a positive relationship. the 
result of this study supports the second possible outcome. 
another plausible explanation for this positive and significant result in this 
study may be associated with the demand for more monitoring costs by minority 
shareholders as a balance against the power of the major shareholders. this scenario 
of large shareholders (such as block-holders) is especially pronounced in the 
Malaysian business environment which is dominated by concentrated ownership 
(ow-yong & Guan, 2000; Mat Nor & Sulong, 2007; haniffa & hudaib, 2006), 
such as family controlled and owner managed companies. this study defines 
block-holders as those shareholders who are not involved in the management 
table 3 (Con’t)
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and does not have family relationship with the managers of the company. Further 
examination of the data reveals that about 21.3% of the cases have the cumulative 
largest shareholders owning more than 25% of the issued shares in the companies, 
and about 42.5% with accumulative largest shareholders owning between 5% to 
25%. this suggests that Malaysian companies are concentrated and less diffused. 
the minority shareholders in this scenario is said to be in the highest risk of being 
expropriated (ow-yong and Guan, 2000) and protection of minority shareholders 
may be problematic (haniffa and hudaib, 2006). this explains the motivation for 
the formation of Malaysian Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group (MSWG) 
in the year 2000. through this body, the minority shareholders can voice their 
dissatisfaction and urge for more monitoring in Malaysian listed companies to 
protect their interests. amongst others, they have urged for more monitoring of 
management activities (bppSM komen, 2005) and demanded that block-holders 
play a more dominant monitoring role (Watchdog group, 2002; Isu KFCh, QSR, 
2005).  this positive relationship may be due to the pressure from this group to 
ensure that their interests are protected. 
this greater demand for monitoring mechanisms by block-holders in this study 
may also be due to their reactions to the requirement by the Code after 1997/98 
financial crisis and to protect their interests in response to the recent increase in 
governance problems among listed companies in Malaysia (such as those highlighted 
in the newspaper: Negligence suit, 2002; Wan hussin and Ibrahim, 2003; Sidhu, 
2006; KFC saman, 2006) and the fear of Enron like-case incident in Malaysia (as 
reported in pengaudit, 2002).  Many companies were closed down/ bankrupts after 
the crisis, which has spurred a lot of countries to improve their governance and 
regulations, and professional bodies to re-look at the existing code of conducts and 
consider its appropriateness. the same scenario had happened in Malaysia, where 
some of the listing requirements were reviewed, the Code was released, Minority 
Shareholders Watchdog Group (MSWG) was formed and the MIa’s bye-laws and 
code of conducts were revised. there are also calls for block-holders to play their 
monitoring roles to protect the shareholder wealth (Watchdog group, 2002; Isu 
KFCh, QSR, 2005). thus it is argued that the positively significant result in this 
study is likely to be due to the fact that, learning from the companies downfall after 
the crisis which also involve the interest of the large shareholders, and the tighten 
regulations (such as those revised requirements introduced by the exchange and the 
Code) after the crisis, coupled with the fact that increase monitoring can compensate 
for their lack of control over other internal decisions by the management, motivate 
the block-holders to answer the calls for a better monitoring role. 
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Further Tests
Further tests are carried out to ensure the robustness of the analysis. In the second 
model, block holders are further breakdown into institutional block-holders 
(INStblKoWN) and non-institutional block-holders (NoN-INStblKoWN), 
in percentages of their shareholdings. to examine the effect of each segment, 
the main model is re-estimated by replacing blKoWN with INStblKoWN 
and NoN-INStblKoWN. the result is presented in table 3 (column 3). It 
reveals that institutional shareholders have a positive significant relationship 
with monitoring costs, while the relationship with non-institutional block-holders 
is insignificant. this result seems to suggest that the greater the ownership by 
institutional shareholders, the greater is the monitoring costs for an organisation. 
Further investigations on these institutional shareholders reveal that majority of 
them are the institutions which have primary commercial objectives in which 
Malaysian government has a direct controlling stake. Examples of the institutions 
are Khazanah Nasional bhd, Employee provident Fund board, lembaga tabung 
angkatan tentera, lembaga tabung haji, and permodalan Nasional bhd. their 
high demand for monitoring costs may be due to the fact that they want to protect 
their investments which among others involve the interest of Malaysian public. 
In the third model the data is categorised into companies with zero block-
holders’ shareholdings, low block-holders’ shareholdings and high block-holders’ 
shareholdings. dummy variables are used to categorize the data. those companies 
with no block-holder in their companies are categorised as companies with zero 
block-holders’ shareholdings, while the low and high block-holders shareholdings 
are segmented using the average block-holders shareholding as a cut-off point. 
the main model is re-estimated, and the result for third model is shown in 
table 3 (column 4). those companies categorised as high block-holders’ and 
low block holders shareholdings appear to have significant relationship with 
monitoring costs. Interestingly, those companies categorised as low block-holders’ 
shareholdings appear to behave differently compared to those with high block-
holders’ shareholdings. high block-holders shareholdings appear to have positive 
relationship with monitoring costs. Further investigation of high block-holders’ 
data indicate that most of them are those institutions related to government, which 
may be a plausible explanation for the demand for more monitoring to protect the 
public interest.  on the other hand, consistent with agency theory, the result indicates 
that low block-holders shareholdings have negative relationship with monitoring 
costs. they appear to demand significantly less monitoring costs compared to other 
categories of block-holders shareholdings. this result may be contributed to the 
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fact that as their shareholdings is considered low, and not very high, they tend to 
be actively involved in the operations and decision making of the companies to 
ensure that their small interests are protected. however, a more detailed study need 
to be carried out before any conclusion can be made, and this area can be explored 
more detail in future research. 
CONCLUSIONS
the objective of this study is to examine the outside block-holders’ ownership on 
the demand for corporate monitoring in the Malaysian business environment. the 
findings indicate that ownership structure, particularly, the concentrated ownership 
by block-holders affect the demand for monitoring costs by Malaysian companies. 
this study also indicates that given the cultural differences, the typical relationship 
between agents and principals in agency theory may not be the same for the non-
western cultures in developing countries compared to those in western culture and 
developed countries. the results support an earlier study which claims that across 
countries, differences in governance system, and market factors, political, legal and 
regulatory framework and internal control systems may influence the agency cost 
and monitoring mechanism chosen by each organisation in each country (Jensen, 
1993). the result suggests that block-holders shareholdings examined in this study 
shows slightly different finding compared to the findings from studies in western 
countries. Generally, block-holders in Malaysia indicate a positive relationship with 
monitoring costs. they appear to demand more monitoring mechanisms which lead 
to more monitoring costs. Further analysis shows that the institutional and non-
institutional block-holders react and demand different level of monitoring costs. 
the institutional block-holders who are mostly government related institutions 
appear to demand more monitoring costs as their share ownership increase, while 
the non-institutional shareholders demand less monitoring costs as their shares 
increase. this is not surprising as the government would normally like to have 
its investment protected since it involves public money and could have political 
implications should the investment goes wrong. 
In addition, the results contribute to provide information to the organisations 
and their stakeholders to better understand the economic rationale of having 
block holders in their equity structure. With concentrated ownership structure in 
Malaysian business environment such as family ownership and owner-managers, 
the block-holders as the outsiders would help in monitoring the insiders to ensure 
that their shareholdings, as well as those of the minority shareholders are protected. 
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